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Abstract—Several systems were developed for supporting
public persuasion dialogs where two agents with conflicting
opinions try to convince an audience. For computing the
outcomes of dialogs, these systems use (abstract or structured)
argumentation systems that were initially developed for non-
monotonic reasoning.
Despite the increasing number of such systems, there are
almost no work on high level properties they should satisfy.
This paper is a first attempt for defining postulates that guide
the well-definition of dialog systems and that allow their
comparison. We propose six basic postulates (including e.g.
the finiteness of generated dialogs). We then show that this
set of postulates is incompatible with those proposed for argu-
mentation systems devoted for nonmonotonic reasoning. This
incompatibility confirms the differences between persuading
and reasoning. It also suggests that reasoning systems are not
suitable for computing the outcomes of dialogs.
Keywords-Argumentation; Dialog; Postulates;
I. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation theory has become a hot topic in Artificial
Intelligence. It is studied for modeling agent’s internal
reasoning, namely for handling inconsistent/incomplete and
uncertain information (e.g., [6], [13]) and for making deci-
sions (e.g., [4], [12]). There is also an extensive literature
devoted to modeling agent’s interactions, namely dialogs in
which agents may exchange arguments with each other, like
persuasion (e.g., [3], [20]), negotiation (e.g., [15], [18]) and
deliberation (e.g., [17]). In all these disparate applications,
an argumentation theory [10] consists of a set of arguments
justifying claims, attacks among those arguments and a
semantics. This latter is a set of criteria describing which
arguments are acceptable together.
Persuasion is a type of dialog in which two agents having
conflicting opinions about an issue try to convince each other
either in public, i.e., in presence of an audience (e.g. [7], [8],
[16]) or in private, i.e., in absence of any audience (e.g. [3],
[20], [24]). In both cases persuasion is done by exchanging
arguments. An important feature of private persuasion is the
evolution of the argumentation systems of both agents by
adding the arguments received from the other party. An agent
is persuaded if the subject of the dialog is supported by
its system at a given step of the dialog. Thus, this kind
of dialogs is more concerned with the dynamics of the
argumentation systems of the agents.
In this paper, we focus on public persuasion in which
agents try more to convince an audience rather than the other
party. In the debate between Holland and Sarkozy before
the presidential election, both candidates tried to convince
the voters. Systems that support this type of dialogs have
three main components: i) a protocol which is a set of
rules that define coherent dialogs, ii) a set of reasoning
systems of agents involved in dialog and iii) a system for
computing the outcomes of dialogs. In existing literature,
the reasoning system of an agent is either a Dung style
abstract argumentation system [10] or one of its logic-based
instantiations (e.g., [9], [2]). The system that is used for
computing the outcomes of dialogs is exactly of the same
nature as those of the agents. However, its arguments come
from the exchanges made by the agents during the dialog
and the attacks are the conflicts among them.
Despite the increasing number of works on modeling
public persuasion, there are almost no work on high level
requirements expected from dialog systems. Consequently,
apart from the termination of their dialogs, it is not clear
what other properties they satisfy. This makes their proper
evaluation difficult if not impossible. This paper provides
a first attempt for defining postulates that guide the well-
definition of dialog systems. We focus on systems that use
Dung style argumentation systems both for modeling the
reasoning of agents and for computing the outcomes of
dialogs. We propose six basic postulates that any such dialog
system should satisfy. Some of them (non-triviality, natural-
attacks-allowanceand dissimulation) ensure that a dialog
system captures natural language dialogs. The three other
postulates (finiteness, consistency and non-determinism) are
more about the quality of dialogs. Since one cannot speak
about a dialog without referring to its subject thus to its
content, then in what follows we consider dialog systems
whose various argumentation systems are logic-based. Our
postulates hold for any instantiation of Dung’s framework.
However, for illustration purposes, we have chosen those
based on deductive logics [2]. The second main contribu-
tion of the paper consists of comparing the six postulates
with those proposed for argumentation systems devoted
for nonmonotonic reasoning, i.e., the systems used by the
agents. We show that the two sets are incompatible. This
incompatibility confirms the differences between persuading
and reasoning. It also suggests that reasoning systems are not
suitable for computing the outcomes of dialogs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II recalls both
the argumentation system proposed in [2] for reasoning
about inconsistent information and the set of postulates it
should enjoy. Section III defines a public persuasion system
and Section IV proposes a set of postulates the system
should satisfy. Section V compares the two sets of postulates.
The last section is devoted to some concluding remarks.
II. ARGUMENTATION FOR REASONING
This section recalls the argumentation system proposed in
[2] for reasoning about inconsistent information. It is a logic-
based instantiation of Dung’s framework [10]. Note that the
same kind of results could also be obtained for rule-based
systems like ASPIC [9].
A. Basic definitions
In [2], the argumentation system is grounded on Tarski’s
logics [23]: i.e., pairs (L, CN) where L is a set of well-formed
formulas and CN is a consequence operator that satisfies the
following basic properties: For X ⊆ L,
• Expansion: X ⊆ CN(X)
• Idempotence: CN(CN(X)) = CN(X)
• Absurdity: CN({x}) = L for some x ∈ L
The notion of consistency is defined as follows:
A set X ⊆ L is consistent wrt a logic (L, CN) iff
CN(X) #= L. It is inconsistent otherwise.
Arguments are built from a knowledge base Σ ⊆ L.
Definition 1 (Argument): An argument built from a knowl-
edge base Σ is a pair (X,x) s.t.
• X ⊆ Σ
• X is consistent
• x ∈ CN(X)
• ∄X ′ ⊂ X such that x ∈ CN(X ′)
An argument (X,x) is atomic iff X = {y} and CN({x}) =
CN({y}). It is a sub-argument of (X ′, x′) iff X ⊆ X ′.
Example 1: Let Σ = {¬wh,¬wh → fe, vs → ¬fe, vs}
be a knowledge base representing the following information:
Mary does not work hard (¬wh), if somebody does not work
hard then he will fail his exams (fe), if somebody is very
smart (vs) then he will not fail his exams, Mary is very smart.
The following arguments may be built from Σ: a0 = (∅, fe∨
¬fe), a1 = ({¬wh}, ¬wh), a2 = ({¬wh, ¬wh → fe},
fe), a3 = ({vs, vs→ ¬fe}, ¬fe).
The following proposition shows that it is possible to
build an atomic argument from any formula that is neither
a tautology nor a contradiction.
Property 1: Let Σ be a knowledge base. For all x ∈ Σ,
if x #∈ CN(∅) and CN({x}) #= L then ({x}, x) is an (atomic)
argument.
Proof: For all x ∈ Σ, it holds that {x} ⊆ Σ, moreover
if CN({x}) #= L then {x} is consistent. Due to expansion,
x ∈ CN({x}). Since ∅ is the only strict subset of {x}, if
x #∈ CN(∅) then ∄X ⊂ {x} such that x ∈ CN(X).
Note that for most classical logics (instances of Tarski’s
ones, e.g. propositional logic, first order logic ...), the set of
all arguments that may be built from a (finite) knowledge
base is infinite.
Notation 1: Supp and Conc are two functions that return re-
spectively the support X and the conclusion x of an argument
(X,x). Sub is a function that returns all the sub-arguments of
a given argument.
An argumentation system is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Argumentation system): An argumentation
system (AS) over a knowledge base Σ is a pair T = (A,R)
such thatA is a set of arguments built from Σ using Definition
1, R ⊆ A× A is an attack relation. For a, b ∈ A, (a, b) ∈ R
(or aRb) means that a attacks b.
In the next sections, we will show that, for a reasoning
system and for a dialog system, the set A of arguments
should not be chosen in an arbitrary way. There are some
constraints that should be fulfilled. The attack relation R
is left unspecified in the sequel since our analysis is in-
dependent from its exact definition. Finally, arguments are
evaluated using any Dung’s semantics [10]. The following
definition recalls some of them.
Definition 3 (Semantics): Let T = (A,R) be an AS over
a base Σ and E ⊆ A s.t. ∄a, b ∈ E s.t. aRb.
• E is an admissible set iff E defends all its elements (i.e.,
it attacks any attacker of its arguments).
• E is a preferred extension iff E is a maximal (for set
inclusion) admissible set.
• E is a stable extension iff ∀a ∈ A \ E , ∃b ∈ E s.t. bRa.
Ext(T ) returns the set of extensions of the AS T under a
given semantics.
The extensions are used in order to define the plausible
conclusions to be drawn from Σ. The idea is to infer a
formula x from Σ iff x is the conclusion of an argument in
each extension. Output(T ) is the set of all such formulas.
Definition 4 (Output): Let T = (A,R) be an AS over a
knowledge base Σ. Output(T ) = {x ∈ L | ∀E ∈ Ext(T ),
∃a ∈ E s.t. Conc(a) = x}.
B. Basic postulates for reasoning systems
A set of desirable properties that the previous systems
should satisfy was proposed in [1]. The postulates are
compatible (i.e., can be satisfied all together). The first one
ensures that each extension supports consistent conclusions.
The second postulate concerns the closure of its output under
the consequence operator CN. The third postulate concerns
sub-arguments. It ensures that the acceptance of an argument
should imply also the acceptance of all its sub-parts.
Consistency: Let T = (A,R) be an AS over a base Σ.
For all E ∈ Ext(T ), {Conc(a) | a ∈ E} is consistent.
Closure under CN: Let T = (A,R) be an AS over a base
Σ. For all E ∈ Ext(T ), {Conc(a) | a ∈ E} = CN({Conc(a)
| a ∈ E}).
Closure under sub-arguments: Let T = (A,R) be an
AS over a base Σ. For all E ∈ Ext(T ), if a ∈ E , then
Sub(a) ⊆ E .
The following simple property is useful for our discussion
in next sections. It shows that an argumentation system
which is closed under sub-arguments and which admits
non empty extensions contains a set of atomic arguments.
Moreover, if the system is closed under CN then it should
contain all arguments supporting tautologies.
Proposition 1: Let T = (A,R) be an AS. For all E ∈
Ext(T ), if E #= ∅ then:
• If T is closed under sub-arguments, then ∀x ∈
∪a∈ESupp(a), if x #∈ CN(∅), then ({x}, x) ∈ E .
• If T is closed under CN, then ∀x ∈ CN(∅) (∅, x) ∈ E .
Proof: Let T = (A,R) be an AS and Ext(T ) its set
of extensions under a given semantics. Assume that E ∈
Ext(T ) and E #= ∅.
Let a ∈ E . Assume that Supp(a) #= ∅. For all x ∈
Supp(a), {x} is consistent (since Supp(a) is consistent and
due to Property 2 in [2]). If x /∈ CN(∅), then ({x}, x) is
an argument. Moreover, it is a sub-argument of a. T being
closed under sub-arguments, this means that ({x}, x) is also
an argument of E .
By monotonicity of CN, since ∅ ⊆ {Conc(a)|a ∈ E} then
CN(∅) ⊆ CN({Conc(a)|a ∈ E}). If T is closed under CN
then CN(∅) ⊆ {Conc(a)|a ∈ E}. This means that ∀x ∈
CN(∅), ∃a ∈ E such that Conc(a) = x. Due to Definition 1,
Supp(a) = ∅. Hence, (∅, x) ∈ E .
III. PUBLIC PERSUASION DIALOG SYSTEMS
This section defines an abstract public persuasion system
that may be used, for instance, in online debate platforms.
The system is abstract since it keeps one of its main
components, protocol, unspecified. Moreover, the notion of
audience is not explicitly represented.
A dialog system has three main components: a set of
agents represented by their reasoning models, a protocol,
and a rule for computing the outcome of any dialog that
takes place between the agents. A protocol specifies the set
of rules governing the well-definition of dialogs (e.g., who is
allowed to say what and when?). In the sequel, we leave this
component unspecified. Thus, our system can be instantiated
by any protocol.
For the purpose of our paper and without loss of gener-
ality, we focus on persuasion dialogs between two agents P
and C. Each of them is equipped with a knowledge base
Σk (with k ∈ {P,C}) and an argumentation system (in the
sense of Definition 2) Tk = (Ak,Rk). It is worth mentioning
that the two agents may use two distinct attack relations (for
instance, P may use the undercut relation [19] whereas C
assumption attack [11] (see section IV)). They may also
choose distinct semantics for the evaluation of arguments.
However, they use the same underlying monotonic logic
(L, CN). Indeed, in order to be able to understand each other
they should at least share the same language.
Before defining the third component of a dialog system,
i.e., its rule for computing the outcomes of dialogs, let us
first define what is a persuasion dialog. The notion of move
is the backbone of a dialog. It consists of two agents (a
speaker and a hearer) and a speech act together with a
content. The speech act is taken from a set S1. The only
restriction on S is that it should contain at least two kinds of
speech acts: “Argue” for exchanging arguments and “Assert”
for making claims.
Definition 5 (Move): Let S be a set of speech acts symbols
containing at least “Argue” and “Assert” symbols. A move m
is a triple 〈s, h, a〉 s.t.
• s ∈ {P,C} is the agent that utters m.
• h ∈ {P,C} is the agent to whom the move is addressed.
• a = act : content s.t. act ∈ S and content ∈ L ∪
AP ∪ AC . If act = Argue (respectively act =Assert)
then content ∈ AP ∪ AC (resp. content ∈ L). Act
and Content are two functions s.t. Act(m) = act and
Content(m) = content.
A persuasion dialog is a “valid” sequence of moves, i.e., a
sequence that satisfies all the rules of the protocol. Since we
do not focus on particular protocols, then we use the term
‘valid’ without defining it formally. Besides, the subject of
a persuasion dialog is a claim made via an Assert move
by one of the agents. Arguments are exchanged in order to
increase or decrease its acceptability.
Definition 6 (Persuasion dialog): A persuasion dialog D
generated by a dialog system DS2 is a non-empty (finite
or infinite) valid sequence of moves (mi) s.t. Act(m1) =
Assert. The subject of D is Subject(D) = Content(m1).
For computing the outcome of a persuasion dialog, an
argumentation system in the sense of Definition 2 is used.
Its arguments are those exchanged in the dialog in addition
to the atomic arguments built from the assertions made in
the dialog. The idea is to consider all the different kinds
of claims (either in form of assertions or arguments) made
by the agents. Defining the attack relation of this system
is more tricky since the agents may use different relations.
In what follows, we assume the existence of a third relation
denoted R which results from a merging of the two relations
RP and RC using an operator ⊕ not specified in this paper.
Thus, R = RP ⊕RC . An example of a merging operator is
the union which considers all the attacks which hold either
in RP or in RC .
1In the literature the following set of basic speech acts is often used
S = {Assert, Argue, Declare, Question, Request, Challenge, Promise}.
2Throughout the paper we refer to a dialog system by DS without
specifying its components.
Definition 7 (AS of a persuasion dialog): Let D be a
persuasion dialog generated by a dialog system DS. The
argumentation system associated with D is the pair ASD =
(Args(D), Confs(D)) s.t.
• Args(D) = {Content(m) | m ∈ D and Act(m) =
Argue} ∪ {({Content(m)}, Content(m)) | m ∈ D
and Act(m) = Assert}
• Confs(D) = {(a, b) | a, b ∈ Args(D) and (a, b) ∈ R}
The outcome of a persuasion dialog D is the status of its
subject wrt ASD.
Definition 8 (Dialog output): Let D be a persuasion dialog
generated by a dialog system DS. Subject(D) is true iff
Subject(D) ∈ Output(ASD).
We can go further by checking wether the agent who
asserted the subject wins or not the dialog.
Definition 9 (Dialog winner): LetD be a persuasion dialog
generated by a dialog system DS with m1 = 〈s, h, a〉. If
Subject(D) ∈ Output(ASD) then s wins the dialog D and
h looses it. Otherwise, h wins and s looses the dialog.
Let Winner be a function such that Winner(D) returns the
agent that wins the dialog D.
IV. BASIC POSTULATES FOR DIALOG SYSTEMS
In the previous section, we have defined what a dialog
system is. It generates non-empty persuasion dialogs. In
what follows, we propose some key features, called also
postulates, that should be satisfied by the system and the
dialogs it generates.
The first postulate concerns the finiteness of the generated
dialogs. This requirement is already known in the literature.
In [14], protocols should ensure termination. Here, we
require finiteness not only for the number of moves but also
for the content of each move. For instance, it is not allowed
to assert x ∧ x ∧ . . ..
Finiteness: Finiteness holds for a dialog system DS iff





is the number of occurrences of atoms and operators used
in the content of m.
As said before, a protocol guides the well-definition of
dialogs and is common to all agents. However, the outcome
of a dialog depends on the strategies of the agents. This is
captured by the next postulate which constrains the dialog
system to be able to generate at least one dialog in which a
subject is accepted and one dialog in which it is not.
Non-determinism: A dialog system DS is non-determinist
iff for all formula x ∈ L, s.t. x #∈ CN(∅) and CN({x}) #=
L, there exist at least two dialogs D1 and D2 generated
by DS, such that Subject(D1) = Subject(D2) = x and
Output(D1) #= Output(D2).
Note that if the set of non-trivial formulas of L (i.e.,
without considering tautologies and contradictions) is infi-
nite then any dialog system satisfying non-determinism can
generate an infinite number of dialogs.
The third important postulate concerns the formalism that
is used for computing the outcomes of dialogs. In our
context, Dung’s system should ensure sound results. Namely,
extensions (under any semantics) represent various positions
in a dialog. Thus, each of them should be coherent. This
leads to a consistency postulate similar to the one presented
for reasoning systems in [1].
Consistency: A dialog system DS ensures consistency iff
for all persuasion dialog D generated by DS, for all E ∈
Ext(ASD), {Conc(a) | a ∈ E} is consistent.
The aim behind building systems for persuasion dialogs
is to automate such dialogs and to conduct efficient ones.
However, these systems should capture as much as possible
natural dialogs. Works by linguists [21], [22] have empha-
sized the main forms of counter-argumentation that may
take place in everyday life dialogs. The first one, known as
“rebuttal” in [11], consists of undermining the conclusion of
another argument. The second form, known as “assumption
attack” in [11], consists of undermining a premise in the
support of another argument.
• An argument a rebuts an argument b iff the set
{Conc(a), Conc(b)} is inconsistent.
• An argument a assumption-attacks an argument b iff
∃x ∈ Supp(b) s.t. the set {Conc(a), x} is inconsistent.
It is thus important for a dialog system to capture these
two forms of attacks. The following postulate ensures this
by constraining the attack relation R.
Natural-attacks-allowance: A dialog system DS allows
for natural attacks iff for all persuasion dialog D generated
by DS, for all a, b ∈ Args(D),
• if a rebuts b then (a, b) ∈ R, and
• if a assumption-attacks b then (a, b) ∈ R.
It is well-known that in public persuasion dialogs, agents
try to convince others about a given claim even if they think
that this latter does not hold. They then hide arguments
and information in order to reach their objectives. A dialog
system should thus allow dissimulation of information. More
formally a dialog system allows dissimulation if it can
generate some dialogs in which the winner would have
change if one of the agents had uttered (had not concealed)
some argument.
Dissimulation: A dialog system DS allows dissimulation
iff there exists a persuasion dialog D between two agents
(say k and l) generated by DS such that ∃a ∈ Ak, such that
Winner(D) #= Winner(D; 〈k, l, a〉)
The last postulate is about the efficiency of persuasion
dialogs. Recall that in such dialogs, agents try to convince
other parties to accept some assertion by putting forward
arguments. These latter are intended to justify the assertion
by new evidences. Thus an argument in which an assertion
is justified by the assertion itself fails to meet the objective
of arguing. Assume a politician who tries to convince a
population that taxes should be increased. Nobody will
accept an argument of the form: “taxes should be increased
because they should be increased”. This does not mean that
nobody will accept the idea of increasing taxes especially
people who have good reasons in favor of tax increase. Thus,
for a persuasion to be efficient, atomic arguments should be
avoided. Similarly, tautologies are not allowed in dialogs
since they are not informative. To put it differently, they do
not bring new information and this is certainly not suitable
in persuasion dialogs.
Non-triviality: A dialog system DS ensures non-triviality
iff for all persuasion dialog D generated by DS, for all a ∈
{Content(m) | m ∈ D, Act(m) = Argue}, a is not atomic
and Conc(a) is not a tautology (i.e., Conc(a) /∈ CN(∅)).
The postulates are compatible (i.e., can be satisfied all
together by a dialog system). There is however a prob-
lem for ensuring consistency together with natural-attacks-
allowance. This is due to Dung’s framework, when it is
instantiated by symmetric attack relations the system is not
able to guarantee to obtain consistent conclusions. Indeed, in
[2], an example of violation of the consistency postulate in
the context of symmetric attack is described. Nevertheless,
the non compatibility of consistency and natural-attacks-
allowance in Dung’s framework does not mean that the two
postulates are not required for dialog systems.
Proposition 2: Finiteness, consistency, natural-attacks-
allowance, non-triviality, non-determinism and dissimulation
are compatible.
Proof: (Sketch) Let (L0,⊢) be a propositional language
whose vocabulary contains at least two propositional vari-
ables Let A0 be the arguments built from L0 by using
Definition 1 and let R0 ⊂ A0×A0 an arbitrary non reflexive
attack relation containing rebut and assumption-attack.
Let DS based on (L0,⊢), with {P,C} the set of agents
and s.t. a sequence of moves D = (mi) is a valid dialog
wrt to the protocol iff D = (m1) or D = (m1,m2) such
that m1 = 〈s, h,Assert : ϕ〉 and m2 = 〈s, h,Argue : a〉
where s ∈ {P,C}, h ∈ {P,C} and ϕ ∈ L0 and ϕ is finite
and a ∈ A0 such that a is not atomic and not supporting
a tautology and Conc(a) is finite. Let the output of D be
computed under stable semantics. Finiteness, non-triviality,
natural-attack allowance hold by construction. Consistency
is ensured by the fact that there is at most two arguments,
they could be together in the basic extension only if their
conclusions are consistent (due to the presence of rebuttal
attack). Non determinism and dissimulation can be shown
by using a dialog with only the first assert move compared
to a dialog in wich an argument against it is added.
Proposition 3: Finiteness, consistency, natural-attacks-
allowance, non-triviality, non-determinism and dissimulation
are independant.
Proof: (sketch) For each postulate, we may provide a
dialog system in which every postulate holds except the one
considered.
V. DIALOG SYSTEMS POSTULATES VS. REASONING
SYSTEMS POSTULATES
A dialog system, with two participating agents, uses three
argumentation systems of the same kind. They are all logical
instantiations of the abstract framework of Dung [10]. Two
of the systems are used for modeling the nonmonotonic
reasoning of the agents and should thus obey to postulates
like those recalled in Section II-B. The third argumentation
system is devoted to a completely different purpose which
is computing the outcomes of persuasion dialogs. The dif-
ference of tasks raises the question of the suitability of the
postulates of the two reasoning systems for the one that
computes the outcomes of dialogs. More generally, are those
postulates compatible with the ones proposed previously for
dialog systems? In this section we show that the two sets of
postulates are incompatible.
A. Reasoning postulates in a dialog context
The first postulate that a reasoning system should satisfy
concerns the consistency of its extensions. It ensures that
the system returns sound results. A similar postulate is
required for a dialog system, namely for its argumentation
system that computes the outcomes of dialogs. While this
postulate is compatible with the two closure ones, in case
of dialogs this is unfortunately not guaranteed. Indeed,
we have shown in the previous section that consistency
is not compatible with natural-attacks-allowance, namely
when symmetric attack relations are used. It is worth
mentioning that in reasoning, symmetric attack relations
can be avoided. Indeed, there exist non-symmetric attack
relations that ensure the consistency postulate (see [2]).
However, things are not so simple in dialogs. Getting rid
of rebuttals in dialogs would constrain the kind of moves
agents may utter. This would also mean that it is not
possible to design dialog systems (based on Dung’s system)
that capture everyday life dialogs in which rebuttals are
very common.
Closure under CN is a suitable postulate for reasoning
systems since it guarantees a form of “completeness” of their
outputs. Tautologies are among the plausible conclusions
that are ensured. These formulas, even if they are trivial,
may serve as a basis for testing the quality of those systems.
However, in a dialog context, they are not suitable since
they are not “informative”. Thus, closure under CN is not
a required postulate for dialog systems. We can even show
that it is incompatible with the non-triviality postulate.
Proposition 4: Let DS be a dialog system. If CN(∅) #= ∅
and DS satisfies non-triviality, then for all dialogD generated
by DS, if the argumentation system ASD admits at least one
extension then it violates closure under CN.
Proof: Let DS be a dialog system and CN(∅) #= ∅. Since
DS satisfies non-triviality then for any dialog D generated
under DS, ∄a ∈ Args(D) such that Conc(a) ∈ CN(∅).
Let E be an extension of the argumentation system ASD
under a given semantics and let ϕ ∈ CN(∅). Then, ϕ #∈
{Conc(a), a ∈ E}. However, ϕ ∈ CN({Conc(a), a ∈ E})
since ∅ ⊆ {Conc(a), a ∈ E} and from the monotonicity of
CN, it follows that CN(∅) ⊆ CN({Conc(a), a ∈ E}). Hence,
ASD violates closure under CN.
Some dialog systems may even miss some non trivial
conclusions. Let us consider a dialog in which only two
arguments ({x ∧ y}, x)3 and ({z ∧ t}, z) are exchanged.
The argumentation system associated with this dialog has
only one stable/preferred extension which contains only the
two arguments. It is easy to check that this extension is not
closed under CN since, for instance, y, t and x ∧ z are not
supported by arguments in the extension.
Closure under sub-arguments is another postulate which
makes sense for reasoning systems but not for dialog ones.
Indeed, in a dialog context, this postulate is ensured in case
agents utter all the sub-arguments of their arguments. This is
certainly not realistic. Let us consider the following dialog
between Carla and Peter.
Carla: Mary will miss her exams. She did not
work hard.
Peter: She worked hard. Her eyes are encircled
and she is very tired.
The corresponding argumentation system contains the two
exchanged arguments and one attack from the argument (say
b) of Peter to that of Carla (say a). This system has one
stable/preferred extension: {b}. This extension is not closed
under sub-arguments since b has at least two sub-arguments
(one for “Mary’s eyes are encircled” and one for “Mary is
very tired”) which are not in the extension. In order to satisfy
the postulate, Peter should utter two additional arguments
for the two statements. The following result shows that this
postulate is even not compatible with the non-triviality one.
Proposition 5: Let DS be a dialog system. If DS satisfies
non-triviality, then for all dialog D generated by DS whose
argumentation system ASD admits non-empty extensions,
ASD violates closure under sub-arguments.
Proof: Let D be a dialog generated by a dialog system
DS. Let ASD be its argumentation system and E be a non-
empty extension of ASD under a given semantics. Thus,
∃a ∈ E . Since E ⊆ Args(D) and DS satisfies non-triviality,
then Supp(a) #= ∅. Consequently, ∃ϕ ∈ Supp(a). There are
two possible cases:
• ϕ ∈ CN(∅). Then, (∅, ϕ) is a tautological argument
and (∅, ϕ) /∈ Args(D) since DS satisfies non-triviality.
Thus, (∅, ϕ) /∈ E .
• ϕ /∈ CN(∅). Then, ({ϕ}, ϕ) is an atomic argument and
({ϕ}, ϕ) /∈ Args(D) since DS satisfies non-triviality.
So ({ϕ}, ϕ) /∈ E .
3We assume here that (L, CN) is propositional logic.
Both arguments (∅, ϕ) and ({ϕ}, ϕ) are sub-arguments of
a and do not belong to E . Thus, ASD is not closed under
sub-arguments.
B. Dialog postulates in a reasoning context
This section discusses the suitability of the postulates of
dialog systems in a reasoning context. We start with the
finiteness postulate which ensures finite dialogs. An impor-
tant question is: do argumentation systems for reasoning
need to be finite (i.e., have a finite number of arguments)?
From a computational perspective, finiteness is certainly a
desirable property since the computation of the extensions of
infinite systems would be hard if not impossible. However,
in practice the finiteness property depends broadly on the
logic (L, CN) underlying the argumentation system. For a
broad class of logics, the set of all arguments that may be
built from a knowledge base is infinite. This is particularly
the case for classical logics. Nevertheless, it was shown in
[5] that for some logics it is possible to consider only a
subset of the whole set of arguments. The corresponding
argumentation system, called core, returns exactly the plau-
sible conclusions of the argumentation system that takes as
input all the arguments built from the base. For some logics,
as shown below, the core is finite. Before presenting the
formal result, let us first introduce some useful notations.
Notation 2: For X ⊆ L, Cncs(X) = {x ∈ L | ∃Y ⊆
X s.t. CN(Y ) #= L and x ∈ CN(Y )} is the set of formulae that
are drawn from consistent subsets of X , and (Cncs(X)/ ≡
) = {[x] | x ∈ X } with [x] = {x′ ∈ L | CN({x′}) =
CN({x})} is the quotient set of Cncs(X) wrt logical equiva-
lence.
Proposition 6: Let F = (A,R) be an argumentation sys-
tem built over a knowledge base Σ. If (Cncs(Σ)/ ≡) is finite,
then there exists an argumentation system F ′ = (A′,R′) s.t.
A′ ⊆ A, R′ ⊆ R, Output(F) = Output(F ′) and A′ is
finite.
Proof: Let F = (A,R) be an argumentation system
built over a knowledge base Σ. In [5], it is shown that each
argumentation system has a core. The idea is to take exactly
one argument from each equivalence class of arguments
of A. Let F ′ = (A′,R′) s.t. A′ ⊆ A, R′ ⊆ R be
that system. Theorem 4 of [5] shows that F and F ′ have
equivalent extensions. Thus, Output(F) = Output(F ′).
Besides, Theorem 5 of [5] shows that in this case A′ is
finite.
However, the core may be infinite for some other logics. To
sum up, two cases can be distinguished:
1) Argumentation systems that have finite cores, which,
then, can be replaced by systems that satisfy the
finiteness postulate.
2) Argumentation systems that have infinite cores which,
thus, violate the finiteness postulate.
Note that the notion of core is crucial in reasoning since it
gathers the key arguments that are necessary and sufficient to
define the plausible conclusions of an argumentation system.
Recall that in such systems, arguments are generated from a
knowledge base without discrimination. However, in dialogs,
agents choose the arguments to utter and may hide some
of them. Thus, the argumentation system associated with a
dialog does not necessarily contain its core. This will impact
the outcome of the dialog since, as shown in [5], when
a system does not contain its core, then the status of its
arguments are not final and may evolve.
Proposition 7: Let DS be a dialog system satisfying
non-triviality. If L contains tautologies and R does not
contain attacks against tautoligical arguments, then for all
non-empty dialog D generated by DS, Output(ASD) #=
Output(CASD)
where CASD = (Arg(
⋃
a∈Args(D) Supp(a)),R) and for
S ⊆ L, Arg(S) is the set of all arguments that may be built
from S using Definition 1.
Proof: Indeed, if D is non-empty then Args(D) is not
empty, thus CASD contains tautological arguments. These
arguments should belong to Ext(CASD). Thus, tautologies
should belong to Output(CASD) but due to non-triviality
they cannot appear in Output(ASD).
As said before, consistency may be violated by the ar-
gumentation system that computes the outcomes of dialogs
due to the use of the rebutting relation (imposed by the
natural-attacks-allowancepostulate). This is particularly the
case when the knowledge base contains a ternary or more
minimal inconsistent subset as shown below:
Example 2: Assume a dialog D whose AS is as follows:
a1 = ({t ∧ x}, x)
a2 = ({y, x→ ¬y},¬x)
a3 = ({x, y}, x ∧ y) a4 = ({x, x→ ¬y},¬y)
a5 = ({v ∧ ¬y},¬y ∨ ¬x) a6 = ({y ∧ z}, y)
The set {a1, a5, a6} is a preferred extension of this system.
However, its set {x, y,¬x ∨ ¬y} of conclusions is clearly
inconsistent.
The inconsistency problem can be avoided by getting rid
of the natural-attacks-allowancepostulate, reducing thus the
kind of natural language dialogs that may be conducted.
This is certainly not a desirable solution.
Non-triviality postulate (which consists of avoiding
atomic arguments and arguments supporting tautologies) is
violated by reasoning systems as shown by Proposition 1.
Non-determinism postulate expresses that for any non-
trivial formula, it should be possible to generate two dialogs
with opposite conclusions. This is very important in dialogs
to ensure strategic debates. However, this postulate is not
suitable for reasoning systems since these latter should
determine in an objective way whether a formula holds or
not.
Dissimulation postulate is clearly not compatible with a
reasoning system. It highlights a main difference between
reasoning and persuading. While in reasoning one looks
for the truth of formulas and considers thus all available
information, in persuading one looks for convincing another
agent about an issue. This may be done by hiding crucial
information which run counter the issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since early nineties, there is an increasing number of
works trying to formalize dialogs in which agents may ex-
change arguments. Persuasion and negotiation dialogs have
received particular attention from AI community. Several
systems were developed for each of them. In those systems
arguments are exchanged in order to support claims in
persuasion dialogs and offers in a negotiation context. The
arguments are then evaluated using argumentation systems
that were originally developed for nonmonotonic reasoning
or for reasoning about inconsistent information.
In this paper, we focused on persuasion dialogs, and
more precisely on public persuasions where two agents
with conflicting opinions try to persuade each other in
presence of an audience. Note that the aim here is rather
to persuade the audience. We studied whether the approach
followed in the literature for defining dialog systems is
sound or not. For that purpose, we considered a recent
argumentation system proposed in [2] for reasoning about
inconsistent information. Note that our study holds for any
other logic-based instantiation of the abstract framework
of Dung [10], like ASPIC system [9]. We then proposed a
general persuasion dialog system. This persuasion system is
general since one of its basic components (the protocol) is
left unspecified. For each of the reasoning and persuading
systems, we propose a set of postulates that should hold.
For reasoning systems, we considered the three basic
postulates defined in [1], namely the consistency of the
conclusions supported by the extensions, their closure
under the consequence operator, and finally the closure
under sub-arguments of the extensions. Regarding dialog
systems, we proposed six postulates: the finiteness postulate
ensures termination of the dialog. Non-determinism
postulate imposes that the system may generate dialogs
with different outcomes. The third postulate imposes
consistency of the outcomes of dialogs. This postulate
ensures that the system that is used for evaluating the
arguments exchanged in a dialog is sound. The fourth
postulate aims to capture as much as possible everyday life
use of counter-argumentation. The dissimulation postulate
ensures that an agent may hide some information. The last
postulate ensures that agents do not utter trivial arguments
during a dialog. An important contribution of this paper
consists of investigating the compatibility of the two sets
of postulates. We have shown that the three postulates of
reasoning systems cannot be satisfied by a dialog system
since in this latter the set of exchanged arguments is not
complete (due to the finiteness of dialogs and also to the
fact that in dialogs, some arguments are considered as
trivial and thus do not need to be exchanged). Similarly,
we have shown that four postulates of the dialog system
cannot be satisfied by the argumentation system. Moreover,
we have established that the outcome of a dialog system
can be different from the outcome that should be obtained
by a reasoning system that would use a knowledge base
containing all the formulas exchanged during the dialog.
To sum up, the study has revealed that a dialog system
needs particular argumentation systems for evaluating its
outcomes. Those systems should obey the nature of dialog.
This work can be extended in different ways. The first
one consists of defining argumentation systems that are
more suitable for public persuasion dialogs and that ensure
the postulates discussed in this paper. Another future work
consists of defining new postulates for dialogs, namely for
capturing manipulation in dialogs. Finally, we are planning
to undertake a similar study in the context of negotiation
dialogs. Recall that in those systems, the outcome of a
negotiation is evaluated by argumentation systems developed
for making decisions.
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